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ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE RULE OF LAW:
A Case Study in the Need to Limit Congressional Delegation
of Authority to the "Fourth Branch" of the Federal Government

Michael C. Kendall*
Introduction
Professor of Political Science Theodore S. Lowi, a former speech writer for the late
Senator Robert F. Kennedy, has isolated the decadent core of American Liberalism and
the political process it has dominated since 1932:
Interest-group liberalism has little place for law because laws
interfere with the political process . . . Laws make government an

institution apart; a government of laws is not a simple expression of
the political process. A good clear statute puts the government on one
side as opposed to other sides, it redistributes advantages and disadvantages, it slants and redefines the terms of bargaining. It can even
eliminate bargaining.
Professor Lowi's analysis is supported by this case study. It traces the evolution of
an essentially parochial administrative decision and political problem into an amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1976. The
problems highlighted by this study are symptomatic of Congress' abdication of
legislative responsibility, the unresponsiveness of administrative agencies whose decisions permeate our daily lives, and the concomitant problem of Congressional offices
engulfed with ombudsmans' chores rather than legislative ones.
The Supreme Court and Delegation of Legislative Authority

Since 1892, various U.S. Supreme Court decisions have upheld ever broader and
increasingly unrestricted delegations of legislative authority to the executive branch,
beginning with granting the President power to raise tariff schedules when he found
that a foreign country imposed an unequal or unreasonable duty on American products.
However, there were certain exceptions. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388
(1935), invalidated one provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 as an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority because of a lack of standards. In
addition Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935), was decided under similar
reasoning. However, since Schechter, the U.S. Supreme Court has struck down no
similar congressional delegation. Illustrative of this is Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
742 (1948), where a delegation to the Secretary of the Interior to allocate water from
the Colorado River without any guideline at all was upheld.
The public policy consequences of such broad delegation were debated with
increasing frequency during the late 1960's and early 1970's. This has largely been the
result of the increasingly omnipresent administrative involvement in the cumulative
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wakes of the New Deal, Fair Deal, New Frontier and Great Society programs. The
relatively provincial political problem treated herein illustrates the consequences of such
delegation.
Civilian Manpower Ceilings: A Case StudN
The problem surfaced with the August 5, 1974 passage of Public Law 93-365, the
Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1974. Title V, "Civilian
Personnel," implemented a program known as "Civilian Manpower Ceilings" by
setting "end of fiscal year strengths" for civilian personnel in the various branches of
the Department of Defense. 4 The total number of civilian jobs to be eliminated by
June 30, 1975 was 32,327. The statutory authority for such ceilings rested with Public
Law 93-155, which passed the previous session of Congress on November 16, 1973. It

granted Congress the authority to set such ceilings and prohibited the appropriation of
funds to unauthorized personnel. 6
Although on the surface this may seem a reassumption of legislative responsibility
rather than further delegation, a closer examination of the text of Public Law 93-365
and its legislative history reveals that it was not. Section 501(2)(b) stated that "all
direct-hire civilian personnel

.

. . whether permanent or temporary" were to be used in

computing the authorized end strength. (Emphasis mine.) (The arguable implication
that they were to be among the ones eliminated was contradicted repeatedly in
committee reports and floor debate, as noted infra.) In addition, the Secretary of
Defense was granted broad discretionary authority under subparagraph (c) of the same
section to vary the totals by as much as one half of one percent when "in the national
interest." Finally, Sec. 502 indicated the "sense of Congress that the Department of
Defense shall use the least costly form of manpower... 7
Contrast this language with the report of Senate Armed Services Committee
issued with their mirror image section of the bill: "The full committee reduction
should be accomplished by not filling new job vacancies and by normal attrition, rather
than any layoffs." 8 The Senate Report continued by voicing "expectations" that the
Secretary of Deiense would manage these reductions in a manner which would avoid
large scale layoffs. The Report placed special emphasis on reductions of headquarters'
staffs as a means of meeting quotas. 9
Even more muddled was the report of the House Armed Services Committee
which admitted the committee itself was not convinced that "end of fiscal year strength
manpower ceilings" were the best way to control civilian employment in the
Department of Defense. (The report, in fact, indicated preference for another method.)
As did their brethren in the Senate, the House Armed Services Committee advised that
the personnel reductions should come from the elimination of excess personnel in
headquarters' staffs. ,0
4. Pub. Law 93-365 (1975), Sec. 501 et. seq. This is for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974 and ending June 30, 1975.
In particular, Sec.501(a)(1) of that Public Law established the following end-of-fiscal- year manpower strengths for
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Marine Corps, 323,529; (c) Department of the Air Force, 269.709; (d) activities and agencies of the Defense
Department other than the various service departments, 75,327, The Secretary of Defense was given authority to
apportion reductions with each branch according to the numbers indicated under Sec. 501(a)(2).
5. Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1974. 10 U.S.C.A. Sect. 138(,K2). states that: end of each fial
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personnel of that component for the fiscal year has beenauthorized by lau'.
6. 10 U.S.C.A. Sect. 138.
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Nonetheless, the final Conference Report of the House and Senate was quite
explicit on the subject of where the cuts were to come in order to meet the ceilings
imposed by both houses.
Because the reduction includes many unfilled spaces and because over 200,000
new civilian employees are expected to be hired in fiscal year 1975, the Department of
Defense should be able to accomplish the full reduction by normal attrition without layoffs
ofpresent employees. i (Emphasis mine.)
The stage for confrontation was clearly set. The realistic management of personnel
was about to collide with Congressional delegation of responsibility that was frosted
with rhetorical political gestures to "the folks back home."
The elimination of some 32,327 jobs under Sec. 501 was accordingly subdivided
by various branches of DOD. The Navy received its share of cuts and subsequently
passed a portion to the Naval Sea Systems Command. That command had, among
other facilities, three Naval Ammunition Depots: first, Hawthorne, Nevada, a state
which sported two Pentagon-supporting Senators; second, McAlester, Oklahoma, in
the home district of Democratic House Speaker Carl Albert, and third, Crane, Indiana
in the home district of a freshman Congressman, Philip H. Hayes, a liberal Democrat
who had unseated a conservative Republican, Roger Zion. The Navy handed out fewer
than 100 cuts to the first two Naval Ammunition Depots, but targeted Congressman
Crane's district for about 600. 12
Although official notice of the 'RIF' (reduction in force) did not go out until
April, 1975, the Naval Sea Systems Command, civilian management and labor leaders
were aware of the impending cut as early as the last half of 1974. 13 By January, 1975,
Washington staff members for newly elected Eighth District Congressman Philip H.
Hayes, and Indiana Senators Birch Bayh and Vance Hartke, were besieged with personal
pleas for help by local labor leaders from Crane's American Federation of Government
Employees (AFGE), who journeyed to the Capital to make their case. What followed
over the next five month period was increasingly intensive and higher level meetings
that involved local political leaders from Indiana's Eighth Congressional District,
members of the Civilian Management Association at Crane, labor leaders, Congressman
Hayes and the Senators, their staffs and, ultimately, the Secretary of the Navy. The
culmination was a meeting chaired by Rep. Hayes in early May, 1975, which was
attended by staffs of other less-affected Congressmen, Senators Bayh and Hartke, local
labor, management and political leaders, the national president and chief counsel for
the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), and Secretary of the
Navy J. William Middendorf II (accompanied by a courtier of admirals, captains and
advisors).

14

On May 12, 1975, six days after the mini-summit, where Secretary Middendorf
was advised by Representative Hayes' staff counsel, with appropriate statutory and
legislative citations, that the proposed RIF was illegal, the Secretary sent a letter
cancelling the RIF without conceding the lack of statutory authority. It state.d that a te-

1I. CaseStud'.: The 30June 1975 Reduction-In- Force at NAD Crane. American Federation of Government Employees and

Crane Management Association, Crane, Indiana, April 1, 1975.
12. Letter from Capt. R. L. McCarthy. commanding officer. Naval Ammuniction Depot, Crane. Indiana. to Commander.
Naval Sea Systems Command, Dec. 20, 1974. The defense facility is named "Naval Weapon Research Center Crane."
but the name at the time of this event was "Naval Ammunition Depot."
13. Since the author of this article was present all all these meetings and Rep. Hares' office spearheaded the
Congressional effort, citations to the voluminous written records of these meetings have been omitted except where
specific reference is made to a salient incident. Cf.. Case Stud): The 30June 19-5 Redution-In-Force at .'AD Crane.
infra at note 11.
14. Letter from Secretary of the NavyJ. William Middendorf II to Rep. Philip H. Hases. Ma% 12. 19"75.

examination of the work load at Crane revealed a higher level than previously
calculated, although less than projected by Crane officials. In addition, according to
Secretary Middendorf, more billets had been freed by the evacuation of Saigon. These
combined factors, he said, would allow a cancellation of the 'RIF' planned for June 30.
1975.

'1

Prior to its decision to rescind the RIF, however, the Department of the Navy
had clearly stated its reasons in letters rejecting written requests for cancellations from
Rep. Hayes. Recognizing that Congress had arbitrarily imposed ceiling constraints
which the Department of Defense (DOD) had opposed, the Navy Department had
responded that the work load at Crane was insufficient to support the number of
personnel on board because of reduced ammunition needs. And the only way to bring
Crane's total down to match work load was by eliminating permanent civilian
personnel. iS This was clearly inconsistent with the ultimate reason given by the Navy
for rescinding the RIF. The only logical conclusion, in light of subsequently verified
work load levels at Crane that supported all personnel on board, and the great amount
of non-ordinance production there, " was that the numbers were chosen arbitrarily and
-politically. - .....
Paralleling the lobbying of Congress and the administrative agency, however, was
Rep. Hayes' effort to further amend the 1976 defense bill, H.R. 6674, in order
permanently to forestall unmerited RIF's. He introduced an amendment to remove
"industrially funded facilities," such as Crane, Indiana, from civilian manpower
ceilings. Is The campaign for the amendment began only days before the vote on the
defense bill. There were, however, several factors working for the amendment's passage.
Of great significance was the Congressman's legislative expertise. When the May 15th
debate arrived, sandwiched between debates about new weapons systems and troop
reductions in Europe, and amidst headlines about Cambodia and Saigon, the freshman
legislator had managed to garner the support of the subcommittee and committee
chairmen who had rejected such an amendment in committee!
Of equal importance were the hundreds of industrially-funded activities, similar to
Crane, in Congressional districts across the nation. In the Navy alone, such bases
employed some 47,460 workers. And with all branches included, the total was about
100,000. An intensive phone blitz to each Congressional office, politely alerting them
to the existence of such a base in their district, and accompained by a door-to-door
campaign on Capitol Hill by union and management officials from Crane, proved
decisive. The amendment passed the House with almost no opposition. ""
Unfortunately, the amendment did not fare as well on the Senate side where it
was defeated by a vote of 50-40. The sponsors on the Senate side, Senators Hartke and
"9
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Bayh, faced several problems. One was that the debate was poorly attended that
morning. Another was the parliamentary separation of the debate from the vote, with
the latter being held that afternoon. Related to that was the defection of several actual
cosponsors (such as Senator John Tunney of California), many of whom did not appear
to realize they were voting against their own amendment! And in all fairness to the
Senate sponsors of the Hayes amendment, it snould be noted that Senatorial opposition
centered in Chairman Stennis' Armed Forces Committee and staff. Senator Stennis
issued a strong letter denouncing the amendment on the eve of the vote, and took to
the floor against it. 21
At this point it would be instructive to ask ourselves why the legislative route was
chosen in the first place. Certainly a legal solution was potentially available. A wide
body of data, both admitted by the Navy and garnered by Congressman Hayes under a
Freedom of Information request pursuant to 5 U.S.C.A. Sec. 522, 32 C.F.R. Sec. 286.5,
297.1 et seq., evidenced arbitrary and capricious action by the Department of the Navy
and DOD actionable under 5 U.S.C.A. 501 et seq. In addition, as discussed infra, the
statute taken as a whole was ambiguous on its face. The existing legislative history at
that time arguably barred such reductions in force of permanent civilian personnel. Even
stronger though, was the specific mandate of 10 U.S.C.A. Sec. 138 for the use of the
least costly form of manpower. End-of-fiscal-year civilian manpower ceilings were
clearly incompatible with this requirement and could be so demonstrated by sound
actuarial methods. 22
In answer this writer would suggest that the legislative route was chosen for
several reasons. The most predominant one expressed was the fear of confrontation
coupled with the chances of a long and perhaps unsuccessful litigation. By giving
ambiguous authority in the statute and taking it away in committee reports and
debates, the outcome for either side's legal position was unclear. Nevertheless, this was
the pragmatic reason for the course chosen.
The Rule of Law: An Alernative to Interest Group Pluralism
The foregoing answer, however, begs the larger public policy issues. This case
study demonstrates three interrelated weaknesses of the American liberal political
system and its administrative extensions: first, the delegation of legislative authority
and responsibility by Congress, without clear guidelines to administrative agencies,
resulting in a rule through interest-group accommodation rather than a Rule of Law;
second, the irresponsible exercise of such authority by administrative agencies, and
third, a related imbalance in Congressional offices' acting as ombudsman-like quasiadministrators rather than as legislators drafting taut enabling statutes for administrative agencies. This is the chronological order in which these problems developed.
Today they function in a vicious circle, seemingly without beginning or end.
Perhaps the best course is to descend backwards into this Maelstrom and examine
the last element of the critique first. In a practical sense, the immediate harms are
evident. Some 75% of a Congressman's staff is devoted to fencing with administative
agenices on behalf of constituents, receptionists mailing pictures, secretaries answering
constituent requests for this and that from the government, case workers dealing with
individual problems (such as social security claims or military discharges), administrative assistants dealing with the public relations side of agency related problems,
21. Views of Manpower Subcommittee, House Post Office and Civil Service Committee. as reported in H. R. Rep. No.
1035, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess.79-81 (1974).

22. See letter from Secretar' of the Navy J. William Middendorf It to Rep. Philip H. Haves, May 12. 1975. and
information in note 14.

legislative aides bucking complaints to administrative agencies instead of drafting or
diagnosing new legislation, and staff counsels straddling committee assignments and
district problems intertwined with administrative agency decisions, etc. Although there
are exceptions, that is the tenor of most congressional offices on Capital Hill.
The second critique stems from the unwillingness of administrative agencies to
operate in a responsible fashion. One can understand the contradictory circumstances in
which the DOD was placed by Congress at once requiring sizeable job cuts and
eliminating the largest potential'pool for such cuts (permanent civilian employees) in
the name of political expediency. What is less easy to accept, however, is the arbitrary
and capricious way in which the Department of the Navy parceled out the RIF's. In
this case, one naval installation in the district of a freshman Democrat and with
diversified work load was selected in preference to two others devoted solely to
ordnance production and in politically more powerful or friendly districts and states.
Additionally, as the subsequent figures demonstrated, either no attempt was made to
correlate the reduction to work load or it was a careless attempt. 23
But, in a deeper sense, the third and final critique is the delegation of legislative
authority, and hence responsibility, to administrative agencies. Congress has failed to
provide specific guidelines because that would require laws offensive to various interest
groups. Instead, liberal democracy has preferred the absence of a rule of law and
substituted pluralistic interest group accommodation before administrative agencies. As
a result the agencies have become the focal point for domination by these interests.
And the rules that emanate from them tend both to vary with the temporarily
dominant interest group and conversely, fail to impose a policy because of the general
dilution that occurs. In practice the agencies are given a general area mandate
("Civilian Personnel") and certain broad goals (reduce employees by about 32,000).
.And just to be safe, statutory ambiguity is further obscured by contradictory committee
reports and floor debate. In short the buck is passed to the agency to make a choice
Congress dares not make because it would cut across interest groups needed by
individual Congressmen. And in turn, the goal of the interest group, originally formed
around one issue (save the jobs), becomes attuned to preserving the interest group per
se (to continue to deal in the arena of interest group pluralism filling the vacuous
absence of a rule of law).
In this case, the Congress failed to indicate clearly that permanent civilian
personnel were to be cut. In addition, it failed to formulate standards for selecting
which facility was to be chosen and for what reason. The statute merely required a
general rationale be submitted by the Secretary of Defense, a rationale that DOD
would develop and present to Congress ex post facto and a rationale lacking specificity
(e.g., Crane did not appear in the report). As a result, the United States Congress was
sidetracked in the midst of the defense bill for 1976 with a floor.debate on a relatively
minor correction of administrative policy that should have been clarified in the original
statute.
What is needed is a change of Congressional policy. But in light of the symbiotic
relationships between the plethora of interest groups in both parties and the individual
Congressmen and Senators, such an internal change is unlikely. A more likely external
source of change is the Supreme Court. It is they who conceded the broad parameters
to congressional delegation of legislative authority in Lichter v. U.S., 334 U.S. 742
(1948), for example. There the court upheld an act allowing the federal government to
23. I

U.S.C.A. Sec. 138.

recover "excess profits," with the sweeping assertion that " . . . a constitutional power

implies a power of delegation of authority under it sufficient to effect its purposes..."
This writer would argue that the problems uncovered in this Crane case study are the
progeny of Lichter, and other such broad delegations of-authority.
The trend has continued with decisions such as Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (1972), upholding the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970's
delegation to the President of the authority to issue orders to stabilize wages and prices
where needed to prevent "gross inequities." With the acquiesence of most jurisprudential thinkers and jurists to the thrust of these decisions, the emphasis has instead shifted
to procedural safeguards before administrative bodies, e.g., Holmes v. New York City
Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, or at a state level, for example, the extensive concern
with procedural due process, necessitated by such sweeping administrative powers,
generated in the Indiana Administrative Adjudication Act, IC 1971, 4-22-1-1 et seq.
Nevertheless, in light of the awesome and essentially unresponsive and irresponsible power (in a democratic sense) of the administrative agencies, the inevitable
conclusion is a return to the rational of Panama Refining. A reaffirmation of the
constitutional prohibition upon the delegation of legislative authority would hail a
return to a rule of law, provide a framework for sound and predictable administrative
decisions, and free Congressional offices from adding ad hoc political pressure to ad hoc
rulings. Or, to paraphrase Professor Lowi, laws will make Congress and administrative
agencies institutions apart and capable of governing by law.
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"It is
a
shameful thing
that
copyrigh
should expire.
It ought to be
freehold,
like land."
-Sir William Schwenck Gilbert
[1836-1919]
English librettist, dramatist
and poet; barrister-at-law.
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